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Perspectives to empirical philosophy of mathematics 
 
1. Introduction 
To mirror the growing influence of empirical philosophy elsewhere, also in the philosophy of 
mathematics we have seen an increasing experimental approach to epistemological questions. 
This approach can be divided into two fields.1 The first field is the psychological direction 
where experiments, most often involving small children and animals, are used to explain the 
development of basic mathematical concepts like natural numbers.2 The second one is 
sociological, involving surveys and interviews. We will return briefly to the psychological 
approach at the end of this paper, but the main focus is on the sociological one.  
While many sociological studies may have philosophical aspects to them, the recently 
proposed Empirical philosophy of mathematics (from here on EPM) of Buldt, Löwe, Müller 
and Wilhelmus is the most pronounced case of deriving traditionally philosophical 
conclusions from sociological data.3 In this paper I will use EPM as the case study to present 
a critical view of the sociological approach to the philosophy of mathematics. 
The philosophical context of EPM is set primarily by the naturalistic view to the 
epistemology of mathematics. Quine (1966) stated his naturalism as the basic principle that 
science is:  
not answerable to any supra-scientific tribunal, and not in need of any 
justification beyond observation and the hypothetico-deductive method (Quine 
1975, p. 72) 
While Quine was concerned with scientific naturalism, the very same principle was taken by 
Maddy (1997, 2007) as the basis of her mathematical naturalism: 
[...] mathematics is not answerable to any extra-mathematical tribunal and not 
in need of justification beyond proof and the axiomatic method. (Maddy 1997, 
p. 184) 
Another main idea in the mathematical naturalism is that when it comes to questions of 
mathematics, mathematical explanations are always preferred to non-mathematical ones. 
Taken  together,  these  two  views  form  the  position  that  we  should  follow  mathematics  
wherever it takes us, and ask the philosophical questions in the resulting narrower context. 
What this context and the relevant questions are is of course a matter of debate, and so are the 
methods by which the questions should be approached. Although clearly a break from the 
                                                             
1 Another related field, computer experiments in mathematics, I consider to be essentially different. 
2 See De Cruz, Neth, Schlimm (2010) for a brief introduction. 
3 The account here is based on five articles: Buldt, Löwe & Müller 2008 (BLM from now on); Löwe 2007; 
Löwe & Müller 2008 (LM); Löwe, Müller & Wilhelmus 2007 (LMW); Wilhelmus 2007. I take all five texts to 
be part of one coherent program and will not focus on the possible minor differences between the ideas in them. 
There is also a new book out expanding the EPM case (see Löwe & Müller (eds.) 2010) as well as presenting 
other angles to empirical study of mathematics. 
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traditional philosophy of mathematics, the naturalism of Maddy, for example, is still very 
much within the old paradigm of doing philosophy.  
More controversially,  EPM has parallels with the sociology of science of Bloor (1976) and 
Latour (1987). While in Maddy’s naturalism mathematics is thought to be the best way  of  
getting mathematical knowledge, in the strong sociological program mathematical knowledge 
is understood as whatever mathematicians hold it to be. Thus, the starting point of EPM is to 
answer epistemological questions by studying the way mathematicians use the basic concepts 
of philosophy of mathematics, including truth, proof, objectivity, knowledge, etc. 
Interestingly, EPM ends up with a strong context-dependent image of mathematical 
knowledge. 
2. The Survey 
The main focus of EPM so far has been on the concepts of mathematical knowledge and 
proof. In the most concrete development, Wilhelmus (2007) has studied the way in which 
mathematicians use the concepts with the help of an Internet questionnaire. The results have 
one extremely surprising feature. To start off, Wilhelmus presented the questions whether 
mathematical knowledge is objective and whether mathematical proof can be defined, getting 
positive answers 82.4% and 89.2% of the time, respectively.4 This  goes  well  with  the  
common perception that most mathematicians are at least “working realists”.5 Then 
Wilhelmus presented a scenario in which a graduate student John works his way to prove his 
supervisor Jones’ conjecture (JC). John’s proof is accepted in a distinguished mathematical 
journal and the subjects were asked whether John knows that JC is true. As expected, 84.9% 
answered positively, 7.5% negatively and another 7.6% “can’t tell”. But it turns out that 
everything was not hunky-dory: John discovers that there is in fact a counterexample to JC. 
Now the mathematicians were asked whether John knows that JC is false. 61.3% answered 
positively, 14.6% negatively and 24.2% couldn’t tell. The considerable move from “yes” to 
“can’t tell” is curious, but the real surprise came when the subjects were asked whether John 
knew that JC was true the morning before he learned of the counterexample. 71.0% answered 
positively, 19.3% negatively and 9.7% couldn’t tell. In addition, the last two questions were 
presented on the same web page, so the subjects could all the time see their answers to both 
of them. 
Before  we  try  to  make  sense  of  this  seemingly  contradicting  data,  I  must  present  some  
criticism of Wilhelmus’ study. First, the target group was said to consist of “international 
research or teaching mathematicians from all branches of mathematics”, led to the study by a 
link posted in Internet newsgroups. But since important claims are made based on the 
assumption that the subjects are mathematicians, can we be sure that the survey reached the 
correct target group? Top researchers and high-school teachers are both mathematicians in 
the sense of the survey, yet in their occupations very different standards are required of 
                                                             
4 Here I follow Wilhelmus’ example and lump together answers like “yes” and “almost surely yes” into one 
positive category of answers, and likewise for the negative answers. 
5 This means that mathematicians work as if realism were correct, i.e. mathematical objects exist and sentences 
have objective truth-values. See e.g. Shapiro 1997, p. 38.  
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mathematical knowledge. Can we know that this does not affect the data?6 Second, while the 
later scenarios include the option “can’t tell”, the preliminary questions about objectivity and 
definability of mathematical proof do not carry it. The objectivity of mathematical 
knowledge, at least, is a very difficult question that many mathematicians would presumably 
not  be  ready  to  answer  conclusively.  To  force  them  to  do  just  that  can  tilt  the  data  
dangerously. Third, the amount of valid replies received in the study was ultimately quite 
low, only 53 in some questions and at most 74. In a sample this small, just a few “can’t tells” 
changed into conclusive answers can make an important difference. At best, a full 24.2% 
answered “can’t tell” to a question. Fourth, the most important finding, that 71.0% still 
thought John knew JC to be true before the counter-example, seems to be largely unsupported 
by other data in the survey.7 With these and some minor issues, it seems that further study is 
necessary before making any conclusive claims about mathematicians’ beliefs, not to mention 
their possible philosophical conclusions. 
Nevertheless, the discrepancy in the main finding is an interesting one, and quite unlikely to 
be totally due to faults in the study. In LMW (2007, p. 12) it is revealed that of the 38 
participants  who thought  that  John  knew JC to  be  false  after  the  counterexample,  a  full  27  
(71.1%) still answered that John knew JC to be true on the morning before the 
counterexample. While eliminating the weaknesses from the survey (the lack of non-
committal option in the question about the objectivity of mathematical knowledge is 
particularly pertinent here) could change the data quite a bit, it is still fair to believe that there 
is a considerable group of working mathematicians who hold both the position that 
mathematical knowledge is objective and that one can know a sentence to be true at time t 
and to be false at another time t’. This is certainly an interesting piece of data. 
3. Conclusions from the data 
In Wilhelmus (2007) and especially in LMW (2007) it is concluded that mathematical proof 
is context-dependent for the subject group, and together with other evidence, the conclusion 
is expanded to concern mathematical knowledge in general.8 We  will  return  to  that  wider  
matter in the next chapter, but for now the focus is on the survey data. That a large group of 
mathematicians are ready to make such conflicting statements is a strong result, but what 
makes it even stronger is the conclusion that this contradicts with their understanding of 
mathematical truth; truth is objective, yet we can still know the same sentence to be both true 
and false at different times. Certainly there seems to be something rotten in such concept of 
knowledge and the claim of context-dependency is not unreasonable. 
However, is the problem really with the concept of mathematical knowledge? The main 
difficulty with the conclusion of context-dependency seems to be that we don’t have a clear 
enough idea what the subjects thought mathematical knowledge to be. The most explicit thing 
                                                             
6 Further problems include the fact that only 108 of the 250 received responses were valid (with very soft 
criteria: submitting personal data and one question answered was enough), of which 76 were from the target 
group. In addition, 21.0% percent of the target group did not possess any degree at all in mathematics. 
7 To be fair, there is a second scenario described in Wilhelmus 2007 (p. 14-16) which does give some added 
support for the main conclusions of EPM, but not really to the data of the first scenario. 
8 This is developed furthest in LM 2008. 
4 
 
we know is that, when needing a committal answer, 82.4% of the subjects believed it to be 
objective. But this is not quite the clarification we should hope for, because we don’t know 
what the subjects interpret objectivity to mean. Objectivity can be characterized both as “you 
can’t make up your own rules” and “there exists a Platonist world of mathematical ideas”. In 
order to make conclusions about context-dependency we would need to clarify what objective 
mathematical knowledge is understood to be. In the survey of Wilhelmus, knowledge is only 
divided into objective and non-objective, and as such these are quite vague concepts. If, as 
the second scenario of Wilhelmus (pp. 14-16) suggests, knowledge is often ascribed even to a 
superficial memorizing of a proof, it is hardly surprising that mathematical knowledge ends 
up being context-dependent. However, this could equally well be interpreted as evidence that 
the subjects understood objectivity in a very weak way.  
In any case, in a project of empirical epistemology, it should not be interpreted automatically 
as something concerning mathematical knowledge in the philosophical sense – which is just 
what the authors of EPM seem to do. What would be needed is a more thorough background 
questionnaire about the notion of mathematical knowledge that the subjects have, including 
questions differentiating between knowledge in the strict philosophical sense and the 
knowledge sufficient to pass tests, and indeed, to get articles published. 
To sum up, there seem to be three interpretations of the data of Wilhelmus. The first one is 
that the survey gets objectivity correct, and the other questions only worked to confuse the 
subjects. I believe this interpretation can be rejected right away for two reasons. First, as 
stated above, there is just too much fog in the concept of objectivity to be settled this easily. 
And of course second, it is just bad science to outright reject survey data which clearly points 
out a difficulty in whatever concept of objectivity the subjects used. 
The  second  interpretation  is  the  one  that  LMW  (2007)  make:  the  survey  gets  the  context-
dependency correct, and when the subjects overwhelmingly professed to objectivity in the 
first question of the study, they did so under a mistaken conception. I see two problems also 
with this conclusion. First, we have seen that the concepts of knowledge and objectivity 
would have to be clarified. Second, this interpretation goes on to say that the majority of the 
82.4% did not know what they were saying when they believed mathematical knowledge to 
be objective. This is a strong piece of data to just reject because it contradicts with other data 
in the study. 
That brings us to the third interpretation: the answers reveal a possible confusion which 
prevents us from making any strong conclusions. Based on the arguments above, I believe 
this  to  be  the  case.  We simply  can’t  know that  the  concepts  of  knowledge,  objectivity  and  
proof were used in congruent enough ways to warrant strong conclusions about them. When 
it would be clear that we are dealing with what most skilled mathematicians believe to be the 
nature of mathematical knowledge in the deep down philosophical sense, and would still be 
ready to ascribe this concept of knowledge both to the case of John knowing the falsehood of 
JC after the counterexample and him knowing its truth before the counterexample, then we 
could be warranted to make such conclusions – provided of course that we believe in the 
validity of the survey method when it comes to philosophical questions.  
5 
 
4. Context-dependency of mathematical knowledge 
My criticism above concerns the argument from the Wilhelmus survey, but in LM (2008) 
there are also other arguments for the context-dependency of mathematical knowledge. What 
they oppose is the view that there exists a uniform standard for accepted mathematical proofs. 
In particular, mathematical proofs are very rarely complete derivations of theorems from 
axioms, which is often given as the standard. As Fallis (2003, p. 55) writes: 
The point of publishing a proof [...] is to communicate that proof to other 
mathematicians. In other words, the mathematician wants to get the particular 
sequence of propositions that he has in his mind into the minds of other 
mathematicians. Somewhat surprisingly, the most efficient way for the 
mathematician to do this is not by laying out the entire sequence of propositions 
in excruciating detail. 
There should be very little to contest in Fallis’ assessment: it should be clear that the level of 
detail varies. Skilled mathematicians require less detail in order to understand the sequence of 
propositions  that  constitutes  a  proof,  while  a  novice  would  no  doubt  benefit  from  more  
detailed derivations. In this fashion, LM (2008) arrive from the supposed invariant starting 
point (p. 92): 
S knows that P iff S has available proof of P 
at the context-dependent result (p. 104): 
S knows that P iff S’s current mathematical skills are sufficient to produce 
the form of proof or justification for P required by the actual context. 
What is meant by “actual context” here is simply the requirements that proofs (or other 
justifications) have in that particular area of mathematical practice. So basically, 
mathematical knowledge according to LM is a widely varied concept determined by the 
subject and the surroundings. In this picture formal derivation retains its power solely by 
being “important for the foundations of mathematics, but [...] it hardly plays any role in 
determining the truth of ‘S knows that P (p. 105)’”.  
While the strict formalist picture of mathematics as complete derivations is a bad fit with 
actual human mathematicians, to say that formal derivation “hardly plays any role” is a very 
strong claim indeed. But EPM takes the context-dependency even further: Buldt (BLM 2008, 
p. 314) states that “the conceptual framework of mathematics has changed so dramatically 
that, say, identifying Greek numbers with modern axiomatic characterizations just seems 
outrageous.”  
I see both of these positions as drastic exaggerations. Take the example of Euclid’s (ca. 300 
B.C.) proof that there are infinitely many prime numbers. His notations and concepts were 
very different from modern ones, yet the very same form of reasoning can be carried out as a 
proof in modern Peano arithmetic. Moreover, we can use an informal proof with modern 
concepts  to  easily  demonstrate  the  infinity  of  primes  –  and  again  it  has  the  same  form  of  
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reasoning. Yet EPM is saying that these three proofs have got hardly anything to do with 
each other. It seems clear that the context-dependent aspects of mathematics – which 
undoubtedly exist – are taken way too far in such conclusions. 
5. Conclusion: directions for empirical philosophy of mathematics 
Above I have criticized EPM on two counts: the methods and the conclusions. The methods 
can definitely be fixed and the conclusions would obviously have to be reassessed based on 
further empirical evidence. But there is also a third question that is independent of those 
issues: the overall justification of the project. It is hard to share the optimism of EPM when it 
comes to surveys as the basis of philosophical conclusions. I believe that philosophical 
questions  about  mathematics  have  conclusive  answers  and  we  have  little  reason  to  believe  
that mathematicians have privileged access to those answers. Once we fix an axiomatization, 
for the working mathematician in that field the rules are set: the philosophical questions 
concerning the concepts and axioms hardly play a major role in the research.  
The sociology of science made famous by Bloor (1976) and Latour (1987) – a very 
problematic project in the best of times – seems particularly unfitting to the problems of 
philosophy of mathematics. EPM belongs to that development and, although it does not 
succumb into Latourian depths of relativism, it makes an effort to relativize mathematical 
knowledge. I believe this to be a false cause, but I also have a lot of skepticism about the 
methodology of EPM : even if the subjects of the study were undoubtedly the best experts on 
the question of mathematical knowledge, how much value do we want to give to 
philosophical opinions given completely without arguments?9 
The psychological approach to philosophy of mathematics, on the other hand, seems to carry 
more potential. In studies like Wynn (1998) we learn about the way small children form basic 
mathematical concepts such as natural numbers. Primitive mathematical concepts (unlike 
EPM claims) have remained largely the same for millennia, and it seems plausible that we 
would get new insight into the philosophy of mathematics if we could unlock the mystery 
how they develop in individuals. To mention just one example, in natural numbers the basis 
of both individual learning and sophisticated axiomatizations like Peano arithmetic is the fact 
that one can always move from one number n into the next number n + 1.10 It is in such 
questions that I see potential in empirical (e.g. neurological and psychological) study to the 






                                                             
9 I want to make it clear that I definitely see value in sociological studies of mathematics. Geist, Löwe & Van 
Kerkhove (2010), for example, is an important reminder that also the mathematical community functions in 
part on knowledge by testimony and a necessarily imperfect peer review system. But we should be very 
careful about making philosophical conclusions based on this, and that is where I see EPM going wrong.  
10 Peano 1889, p. 94. 
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